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students, most of whom were minors, 
from lewd and indecent language in a 
school-sponsored setting. 
The Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed. Chief Justice Burger, speaking 
for the majority, distinguished Tinker as 
markedly different from the facts in this 
case. Specifically, that the penalties im-
posed on Fraser were unrelated to any 
political viewpoint. Moreover, the Chief 
Justice emphasized that "[i]n upholding 
the student's right to engage in a nondis-
ruptive, passive expression of a political 
viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful 
to note that the case 'did not concern speech 
or action that intrudes upon the work of 
the schools or the rights of other students." 
106 S.Ct. at 3163. It was against this back-
ground that the Court considered the level 
of First Amendment protection accorded 
to Fraser's nomination speech. 
The Court first discussed the role and 
purpose of the American public school 
system. The Court stated that the objec-
tives of public education were to inculcate 
"fundamental values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system." 
Id. at 3164, (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 
441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979». Conceding 
that these "fundamental values" included 
tolerance of unpopular views, both politi-
cal and religious, the Court determined 
that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advo-
cate unpopular and controversial views in 
schools and classrooms must be balanced 
against society's countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior." Id. at 3164. More-
over, the Court declared that while the 
first amendment guarantees adults wide 
protection in matters of public verbal ex-
pression, it does not follow that because 
adults are not prohibited from using offen-
sive forms of expression when making a 
political point, that children in a public 
school must be given the same latitude. 
Secondly, the Court expressed unequiv-
ocally that one of the functions of public 
school education is "to prohibit the use of 
vulgar and offensive terms in public dis-
course." Id. at 3165. The Court reasoned 
that the "fundamental values necessary to 
the maintenance of a democratic political 
system" discourage the use of highly offen-
sive terms. Furthermore, the Court indi-
cated that the Constitution is void of any 
language which prohibits the states from 
deciding that certain expressions are inap-
propriate and subject to sanctions. Realiz-
ing that the inculcation of these funda-
mental values are truly the responsibility 
of the schools, the Court left the deter-
mination of what speech was appropriate 
in the classroom or assembly to the school 
board. 
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The Court then turned its attention to 
frrstamendmentjurisprudencecon~g 
limitations on free speech where the speech 
is sexually explicit and reaches an unlim-
ited audience, especially an audience in-
cluding children. The Court acknowledged 
that these cases recognize a concerned in-
terest on the part of parents and school 
authorities "to protect children - especially 
those in a captive audience-from exposure 
to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd 
speech." Id.; See Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Board of Education 
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In addition, 
the Court cited cases which recognize an 
interest "in protecting minors from ex-
posure to vulgar and offensive spoken lan-
guage." 106 S.Ct. at 3165; See FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
Thus, the Court concluded that the first 
amendment did not prevent the school 
district from suspending Fraser in re-
sponse to his offensively lewd' and inde-
cent speech, and further concluded that to 
permit such a speech would "undermine 
the school's basic educational mission." 
106 S.Ct. at 3166. Remarking that "[a] 
high school assembly or classroom is no 
place for a sexually explicit monologue di-
rected towards an unsuspecting audience 
of teenage students," the Chief Justice con-
cluded that "it was perfectly appropriate 
for the school to disassociate itself to make 
the point to the pupils that vulgar speech 
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent 
with the 'fundamental values' of public 
school education." Id. 
The Court's holding in Fraser danger-
ously limits a high school student's first 
amendment right to free speech. Giving 
school officials the unbridled discretion to 
apply the nebulous standard of"indecency" 
in controlling the speech of high school 
students, certainly increases the risk of 
cementing white, middle-class standards 
for determining what is acceptable and 
proper speech and behavior in the public 
schools. Language considered "indecent" 
in one segment of society may be common, 
household usage in another. Freedom to 
be different in one's individual manner of 
expression is a core constitutional value. 
The first amendment reflects the consid-
ered judgment of the Founding Fathers 
that government shall not be permitted to 
use their power to control individual self-
expression. 
Finally, the Court characterizes Matthew 
Fraser as a "confused boy" whose "lewd, 
indecent, and offensive" speech could be 
"seriously damaging to its less mature au-
dience, many of whom were only 14 years 
old and on the threshold of awareness of 
human sexuality." 106 S.Ct. at 3165. The 
Supreme Court obviously fails to consider 
the everyday environment that these stu-
dents live in. Fraser was speaking not to 
children, but to young adults. Most high 
school students are beyond the point of 
being sheltered from the many sights and 
sounds they encounter everyday. Although 
school officials and parents may be of-
fended by certain utterances and actions, 
high school students, as young adults, 
should be able to determine for themselves 
whether such conduct is inappropriate and 
whether it should be disciplined. 
-Steven M. Schrier 
Falwell v. Flynt: NEW YORK TIMES 
"ACTUAL MALICE" STANDARD 
DISTINGUISHED IN ACTION FOR 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
In Falwell v. Flynt, Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., __ 
F.2d __ (4th Cir. 1986), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that the level of protection 
available to a publisher in a suit by a public 
figure for emotional distress arising from a 
false publication is met by the recklessness 
standard of the tort itse1£ The court further 
held that a New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964), .analysis is not re-
quired. In so holding, the court affirmed 
the decision by the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia. 
In Falwell, the lawsuit arose out of an "ad 
parody" that appeared in Hustler maga-
zine, which attempted to satirize an adver-
tising campaign for Campari Liqueur. In 
the actual Campari advertisements, celeb-
Fities talk about their "first time," meaning 
their fust encounter with Campari Liqueur, 
but there is a double entendre with a sex-
ual connotation. In the Falwell parody, he 
is the celebrity in the advertisement which 
contains his photograph and an interview 
which is attributed to him. In this inter-
view, Falwell allegedly details an incestu-
ous rendezvous with his mother in an out-
house in Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell's 
mother is portrayed as a drunken and im-
moral woman and he is portrayed as a 
hypocrite and a habitual drunkard. Fal-
well filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia 
alleging three theories ofliability: libel, in-
vasion of privacy under Va. Code § 8.01-40 
(1984), and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The district court dismissed 
Falwell's invasion of privacy claim and the 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants 
on the libel claim, finding that no reason-
able man would believe that the parody 
was describing actual facts about Falwell. 
On the emotional distress claim, the jury 
returned a verdict against Flynt and Hustler 
but not Flynt Distributing Co. Falwe/l, 
__ F.2d at __ . 
On appeal, the defendants made the con-
stitutional argument that since Falwell is a 
public figure, the "actual malice" standard 
of New York Times v. SuI/ivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), must be met before he can re-
cover for emotional distress. In New York 
Times, the Supreme Court determined that 
libel actions brought by public officials 
against the press can have a chilling effect 
on the press, inconsistent with the first 
amendment. Therefore, when a public of-
ficial sues for libel based upon a tortious 
publication, the defendant is entitled to a 
degree of first amendment protection. Fal-
well, __ F.2d at __ . This protection 
was extended to cases in which the plain-
tiff is a public figure. Curtis Publishing 
Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
The court of appeals determined that 
"since Falwell is a public figure and the 
gravamen of the suit is a tortious publica-
tion, the defendants are entitled to the 
same level of first amendment protection 
in the claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress thllt they received in 
Falwell's claim for libel." Falwell, __ 
F.2d at __ . The court of appeals rea-
soned that "to hold otherwise would frus-
trate the intent of New York Times and en-
courage the type of self censorship which 
the Supreme Court sought to abolish." Id. 
at_._. 
The court of appeals determined that the 
issue then becomes what form the first 
amendment protection should take in an 
action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Flynt and Hustler argued 
that Falwell must prove that the advertise-
ment was published with " ... knowing 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth," 
which is the "actual malice" standard of 
New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at __ . 
Although the court agreed that the same 
level of protection is due the defendants, it 
did not believe that the literal application 
of the "actual malice" standard is appropri-
ate in an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. !d. at __ . The court 
rationalized that when the "actual malice" 
standard is applied to a defamation action, 
no elements of the tort are altered. There-
fore, the "actual malice" standard merely 
increases the level of fault the plaintiff 
must prove in order to recover in an action 
based upon a publication. Id. at __ . If 
the plaintiff was required to prove the de-
fendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard of the truth in an action for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, it 
would add a new element to this tort and 
significantly alter its nature. !d. at __ . 
The court of appeals found that the New 
York Times standard was misread by the 
defendants because their argument em-
phasized the language "falsity or disregard 
for the truth." Properly read, New York 
Times focused on culpability, and the em-
phasis of the "actual malice" standard is 
"knowing ... or reckless." [d. at __ . 
The court of appeals analyzed the first of 
the four elements of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress under Virginia law, 
which requires that the defendant's mis-
conduct be intentional or reckless. This 
element is precisely the level of fault that 
New York Times requires in an action for 
defamation. !d. at __ . The court found 
that "the first amendment will not shield 
intentional or reckless misconduct result-
ing in damage to reputation, and neither 
should it shield such misconduct which 
results in severe emotional distress." Id. 
at __ . 
The court of appeals further held that 
when the first amendment requires the ap-
plication of the "actual malice" standard, 
the standard is met when the jury finds 
that the defendant's "intentional or reck-
less misconduct" has proximately caused 
the alleged injury. Here, the jury made 
such a finding and thus the constitutional 
standard was satisfied. Id. at __ . 
The Falwell decision clearly distinguishes 
recovery for emotional distress from recov-
ery for defamation under the New York 
Times standard and emphasizes that the 
"actual malice" standard focuses on the de-
fendant's alleged "intentional or reckless" 
conduct, not whether the plaintiff can prove 
the defendant's "knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard for the truth." 
- J. Russell Fentress IV 




Unkle v. Unkle: MARYLAND 
DEFINES MARITAL PROPERTY 
IN PERSONAL INJURY SUIT 
In Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 505 
A.2d 849 (1985), the Maryland Court of 
Appeals for the first time considered the 
issue of whether a spouse's inchoate per-
sonal injury claim which accrued during 
marriage was marital property within the 
contemplation of the Maryland Family 
Law Article's definition of marital prop-
erty. 
The facts of the case are uncontroverted. 
Gypsy Jo and William Edward Unkle were 
divorced a vinculo matrimonio on Novem-
ber 11, 1984, by the Circuit Court for 
Carroll County. In awarding marital prop-
erty to Gypsy Jo, the court also awarded 
her 20% of any monies received by William 
from a pending personal injury case stem-
ming from an injury received in August of 
1983. The court awarded the money on an 
"if, as and when paid basis." 
The parties were separated at the time of 
the accident. William resided with his 
parents and received no assistance from 
Gypsy. Although William had retained 
counsel to represent him in the personal 
injury case, no suit had been filed prior to 
the issuance of the divorce decree. 
William appealed the circuit court's de-
cision to the court of special appeals and 
the court of appeals granted certiorari 
prior to that courts consideration of the 
issue. 
The court first undertook to define the 
meaning of the word property, noting that 
the Maryland cases have generally given 
the word a very broad definition. Spe-
cifically, the court quoted Deering v. Deer-
ing, 292 Md. 115,437 A.2d 883 (1981), 
wherein the court defined property as 
"everything which has exchangeable value 
or goes to make up a man's wealth-every 
interest or estate which the law regards of 
sufficient value for judicial recognition." 
Unkle, 305 Md. at 590. 
In Deering, the court recognized that a 
spouse's unmatured, fully vested pension 
rights were a form of marital property sub-
ject to equitable distribution under the 
Maryland statute. The court concluded 
that a spouse's pension right, "to the extent 
accumulated during the marriage", was a 
form of marital property and subject to 
distribution. The court specifically noted 
that a pension right was a contract right, 
derived from the terms of an employment 
contract. The court noted that a contract 
right is "Not an expectancy but a chose in 
action, a form of property." Id. at 591. 
In addition, the court noted that in 
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347,493 A.2d 
1074 (1985), it held that a professional de-
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